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Is skill dispersion a source of comparative advantage? While it is established that a country's aggregate
endowment of human capital is an important determinant of comparative advantage, this paper investigates
whether the distribution of skills in the labor force can play a role in the determination of trade flows.
We develop a multi-country, multi-sector model of trade in which comparative advantage derives
from (i) differences across sectors in the complementarity of workers' skills, (ii) the dispersion of skills
in the working population. First, we show how higher dispersion in human capital can trigger specialization
in sectors characterized by higher substitutability among workers' skills. We then use industry-level
bilateral trade data to show that human capital dispersion, as measured by a standard international
metric, has a significant effect on trade flows. We find that the effect is of a magnitude comparable
to that of aggregate endowments. The result is robust to the introduction of several controls for other
proximate causes of comparative advantage.
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One of the mainstays of the theory of comparative advantage is that countries￿ factor endow-
ments determine the pattern of trade. An established theoretical framework, the Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson factor proportion theory, and numerous related empirical studies1 identify quantities
such as the stocks of human and physical capital of countries as primary sources of comparative
advantage. In this paper we provide evidence supporting an alternative, and empirically sizeable,
source of comparative advantage: the dispersion of human capital in the working population.2
Why would the distribution of human capital matter for specialization and trade? We argue
that sectors vary in the degree of complementarity among the skills of workers employed. We
conjecture that for some sectors, for example engine and turbine manufacturing, it is essential to
employ workers of similar skills at every stage of production,3 while for other sectors, like computer
or apparel, the output of a team is sensitive to the presence of extremely skilled individuals, even
if some stages of production are left to workers with lower human capital. Given that sectoral
technologies may vary in this dimension, we investigate the hypothesis that countries with greater
skill dispersion specialize in sectors characterized by higher substitutability among workers￿skills.
The idea that skill dispersion may lead to specialization has been the object of work by Gross-
man and Maggi (2000), henceforth GM, who show that, in a two-country, two-sector model, the
country with a relatively more dispersed skill distribution may specialize in the sector that bene￿ts
from matching workers of di⁄erent skill levels. This paper builds upon GM￿ s insight, making two
contributions. First, it proposes a multi-country, multi-sector model where skill dispersion gen-
1Among others, Romalis (2004), testing the predictions of the theory about commodity trade, and Bowen et al.
(1987), Tre￿ er (1993), Tre￿ er (1995), and Davis and Weinstein (2001), testing the factor content predictions of the
theory.
2Human capital is determined by many factors, among which formal education, family upbringing, underlying
ability and on-the-job training. Throughout this paper we refer to human capital or skills, terms that we use
interchangeably, as a set of attributes that are of productive use in the workplace.
3Using the terminology of Kremer (1993), these sectors exhibit an O-ring technology.
2erates testable implications for the pattern of international trade. Second, it provides empirical
evidence that diversity is in fact a strong determinant of specialization. We present evidence that
the dispersion of human capital matters as much as its stock in determining comparative advantage,
a novel ￿nding to the best of our knowledge.
A ￿rst glance at the data reveals that cross-country di⁄erences in skill dispersion are con-
siderably larger than di⁄erences in the average skills of workers. We employ the distribution of
scores in the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS), an internationally comparable measure
of work-related skills, as a proxy for the distribution of human capital. Figure 1 reports the mean
and standard deviation of IALS during 1994-1998. The coe¢ cient of variation of the standard
deviation of log-scores is an order of magnitude larger than that of the average log-scores.
The reasons why countries at similar stages of development di⁄er in their skill distribution are
beyond the scope of this study;4 such di⁄erences may be due to the degree of centralization in the
education system and curricular control (Stevenson and Baker, 1991), the existence of elite schools,
sorting and segregation,5 early tracking,6 local school ￿nancing (Benabou, 1996) and the share of
private and public schools (Takii and Tanaka, 2009).7
The ￿rst contribution of this paper is a theoretical framework that allows us to investigate the
relevance of skill dispersion for comparative advantage in a multi-sector multi-country environment.
This is related but distinct from the one presented in GM. They show that, if skills are perfectly
observable and the production function is symmetric, CRS and supermodular in the skills of work-
4What is not beyond the scope of this study is a discussion of how the endogeneity of skill dispersion might a⁄ect
our empirical results. See Section 4.4.
5The existence of peer e⁄ects, as documented for example by Hanushek et al. (2003) and Hoxby and Building
(2000), implies that segregation and sorting might result in even higher inequality of educational outcomes. An
example of this ampli￿cation mechanism is provided by Friesen and Krauth (2007).
6Tracking refers to the practice of grouping students in di⁄erent schools according to their ability. Woessmann
et al. (2006) show that when grouping happens before age 10, inequality in education outcomes increases at the
country level.
7James (1993) argues that the mix of public and private educational services is due, for example, to the degree of
religious heterogeneity within a country.
3ers,8 then diversity is not a source of comparative advantage and there is no trade. Therefore their
main result is that comparative advantage emerges only if there are two sectors, one supermodular
and one submodular.9
Our modeling choices depart from GM￿ s in two directions. First, we only consider supermod-
ular production functions that simply vary in the degree of complementarity of workers￿skills.
This choice allows us to link our work more easily to the existing trade literature, in which most
production functions are supermodular. The model features a continuum of sectors that vary in
the elasticity of substitution across workers￿skills. Second, we consider a world where, because
of frictions in the labor market and unobservability of workers￿skills, random matching prevails
between workers and ￿rms.10 This modeling choice is dictated primarily by tractability (our model
can be easily applied to a world of many countries and many sectors), but it also re￿ ects the fact
that a large part of workers￿skills is ex-ante unobservable to both workers and employers.11 Ran-
dom matching implies that the skill distribution prevailing in a country is re￿ ected at the ￿rm and
industry level. Recent international evidence (see Iranzo et al., 2008, and Lazear and Shaw, 2008)
suggests that most of wage dispersion is in fact within, rather than between, ￿rms.
We embed these features in a model of trade with monopolistic competition for two reasons.
First, monopolistic competition smooths out the sharp trade predictions that would otherwise re-
8Supermodularity implies that the marginal product of a more able worker is increasing in the ability of the
co-worker.
9Trade emerges only conditional on the existence of a supermodular sector, where workers of identical abilities are
paired together, i.e. self-matching prevails, and of a submodular sector, where the most skilled workers are paired
with the least skilled co-workers, i.e. cross-matching prevails. Submodularity of the production function implies that
the marginal bene￿t of increasing a workers￿skills is decreasing in the skills of the co-worker. In this framework the
country with more dispersed skill distribution specializes in the submodular sector.
10We expand on an element introduced by GM, who consider imperfect observability of skills. At the end of the
paper the authors ￿note in passing that, with imperfect matching, trade would take place between two countries
with di⁄erent educational processes even if tasks were complementary in all production activities￿ , i.e. all production
functions were super-modular, which is the case we consider. We extend this model to many countries and sectors in
order to derive testable implications.
11In particular, as it will become clear in the empirical section, we refer to skills which are ￿ residual￿and unrelated
to observable characteristics of the workers.
4sult from a perfectly competitive Ricardian model.12 Moreover, similarly to Helpman and Itskhoki
(2009a), Helpman et al.(2008a; 2008b), and for reasons discussed throughout the paper, we intro-
duce simple labor market frictions, which are incompatible with perfect competition.
We show that, under some conditions, countries that have a more heterogeneous labor force
export relatively more in sectors where the degree of complementarity among workers￿skills is
lower. Since the degree of complementarity across workers￿abilities is not directly observable, we
exploit the structure of the model, which delivers a direct link between the unobservable degree of
complementarity and an observable quantity, namely the dispersion of sectoral wages. In our model,
due to labor market frictions, workers hired by a ￿rm are not interchangeable with workers outside
such ￿rm; therefore ￿rms and workers engage in bargaining over the surplus. In the presence of
random matching, the resulting wage distribution uniquely re￿ ects the degree of complementarity
among workers￿skills. Sectors with higher complementarity are characterized by a more compressed
wage distribution because, for example, workers with skills much higher than the average contribute
to surplus relatively less, a fact re￿ ected in their wage.
The second contribution of the paper is to test the prediction that countries with more dispersed
skill distributions specialize, and therefore export relatively more, in sectors with higher wage
dispersion. In order to bring the empirical analysis in line with the theoretical assumption of
unobservable skills, we purge both our measure of skills (from the IALS) and individual workers￿
wages (from the US Census), of any component related to observable characteristics, to obtain
residual scores and residual wages. We adapt the empirical approach of Helpman et al. (2008c),
henceforth HMR, to industry-level trade ￿ ows and augment it with our variable of interest. We
show that the interaction of country skill dispersion and sector wage dispersion is a signi￿cant and
12One of the points made by Costinot and Komunjer (2007) is that the sharp predictions of Ricardian models can
be smoothed also by introducing random productivity di⁄erences across countries within each sector.
5economically large determinant of exports, even after controlling for a variety of trade barriers,
exporting country and importing country-industry ￿xed e⁄ects (as dictated by the theory). We
also include determinants of comparative advantage based on aggregate factor endowments as in
Romalis (2004). Our empirical analysis provides robust evidence that skill dispersion matters as
much as the aggregate endowment of skills in the determination of trade ￿ ows.
So far, we have extensively discussed the relation of this paper to its closest predecessor, GM.
Three other papers present interesting alternative theoretical mechanisms for why the skill distrib-
ution matters for trade. Ohnsorge and Tre￿ er (2007) propose a model with two-dimensional worker
heterogeneity and show that, when each worker represents a bundle of two skills, the correlation
of the two in the population determines comparative advantage. Grossman (2004) starts from the
premise that, in some sectors, incomplete contracts make it di¢ cult to tie remuneration to an in-
dividual worker￿ s output. In a country with high skill dispersion highly skilled individuals prefer
to sort into sectors where individual performance is easier to measure, rather than working in an
industry where the common wage is dragged down by workers with relatively low skills. Grossman
(2004) shows that this type of endogenous sorting determines comparative advantage. Finally, in
Bougheas and Riezman (2007) comparative advantage emerges as a result of di⁄erential returns to
skills in di⁄erent sectors.
Our ￿ndings relate to recent literature emphasizing less traditional sources of comparative
advantage. In this literature the endowment of a country, interpreted in its broadest sense, includes
institutional features, such as the ability to enforce contracts (Levchenko, 2007, and Nunn, 2007),
the quality of the ￿nancial system (Manova, 2008a; 2008b) and the extent of labor market frictions
(Helpman and Itskhoki, 2009a, Cuæat and Melitz, 2007, Tang, 2008). We view our contribution
as related to this ￿ institutional endowment￿view of comparative advantage because human capital
6dispersion in a country is to a large extent the result of the prevailing educational system. This, in
turn, can be considered, if not immutable, a slow-moving attribute of a country.13
Finally, as already mentioned, this paper also contributes to the large and established literature
on factor endowments and comparative advantage, a topic which still receives a great deal of
attention. For example, in a recent contribution to this literature, Costinot and Vogel (2009) build
a model with a continuum of sectors and a continuum of skill levels and investigate the e⁄ect of
trade on inequality in a rich framework.14
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the two-country multi-sector model and
delivers the basic prediction about trade ￿ ows. Section 3 extends the model to many countries.
Section 4 presents the empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes. All proofs and a detailed data
description can be found in the Appendix.
2 Two-Country Model
This section presents a model of trade between two countries, Home and Foreign, characterized by
di⁄erent skill distributions. The two countries may also vary in size, but are otherwise identical.
We denote a country by c where c 2 fH;Fg. When it does not create ambiguity we drop the
country subscript. Section 3 extends the model to a multi-country world.
2.1 Preferences
Each country c is populated by a measure Lc of individuals. Utility of the representative consumer
depends on the consumption of a homogeneous good Q(0) and a continuum of di⁄erentiated goods
13Glaeser et al. (2004) show that education is signi￿cantly more persistent than several other institutional features,
such as the form of government.
14Besides their object of interest being di⁄erent from this paper￿ s, their assignment model yields the result that in
equilibrium a sector employs only workers of a unique skill level, and as such it is not readily comparable to ours.
7Q(i) with i 2 I. The utility function U is Cobb Douglas so that a constant share ￿(i) is spent on
good i:








where Q(i) is the consumption index over the set ￿(i) of available varieties of product i. Preferences









with ￿ > 1:
where q(!;i) is the quantity consumed of variety ! of good i. Under these preferences, demand for






where E is total expenditure, p(!;i) is the price of variety ! of i, and P (i) is the ideal CES price
index of aggregate Q(i).
2.2 Production
Good Q(0) is produced under constant returns to scale by perfectly competitive ￿rms. The tech-
nology is such that one unit of labor produces one unit of output. We choose Q(0) as our numeraire
and we assume that all countries produce the numeraire good in positive quantity, which implies
that the wage in sector 0, w(0), is equal to one.
Each di⁄erentiated sector i is populated by a continuum of identical ￿rms, each producing a
8di⁄erent variety !. The market is characterized by monopolistic competition among ￿rms, with
free entry. There is also a ￿xed cost of production f. The amount of output produced y depends
on the skill level of each worker hired a, the measure of workers hired h and the distribution of
skills across workers ~ g (a). The distribution of skills matters for production because we assume that
di⁄erent levels of skills are not perfectly substitutable.15 In particular, the production function of
a representative ￿rm in a sector depends on the degree of complementarity ￿ among workers￿skills









< ￿ < 1 (2)
The parameter ￿ measures the degree of skill complementarity, since the elasticity of substitution
among skills levels, for a ￿xed mass of workers h, is given by 1
1￿￿, which increases with ￿. The
larger ￿, the more substitutable workers of di⁄erent skill levels are.16 The key assumption in this
model is that each sector i is characterized by a di⁄erent value of ￿ in production, and therefore by
a di⁄erent degree of complementarity among workers￿skill levels. Since ￿ is the only characteristic
that di⁄erentiates sectors, in the remainder of the theoretical section we drop the index i and index
sectors by their parameter ￿.
Two properties of this production function are worth discussing in detail. First, for given mass of
workers h, the function is homogeneous of degree one in the skills of workers. This property stresses
the relative importance of the shape, rather than location, of the distribution of skills. Second,
the production function features increasing returns to the mass of workers, given the distribution
15One possible interpretation is that the skill of each worker is a di⁄erentiated input in the production process. An
alternative interpretation, along the lines of the paper by Takii and Tanaka (2009), is that each worker produces a
di⁄erentiated intermediate good, in quantity proportional to her skills, and intermediate inputs are aggregated by a
CES production function.
16For a ￿xed h, this production function is analogous to the one introduced by Grossman and Maggi (2000), p.
1261.
9of skills.17 In particular, ￿ also represents the extent of increasing returns to scale (as well as the
degree of complementarity), but this feature plays no important role in the model.18 We restrict
the size of ￿ to guarantee that the ￿rm￿ s maximization problem is concave, as described in Section
2.5.
2.3 Labor Market
We introduce labor market frictions in the spirit of Helpman and Itskhoki (2009a), although for
simplicity we assume that there are no frictions in sector 0. Workers look for jobs in the homo-
geneous sector or in one of the di⁄erentiated good sectors. Workers are characterized by di⁄erent
levels of skills and skill is a continuous variable distributed in the workers￿population of country c
according to a density function g (a;c). In the di⁄erentiated sectors ￿rms pay a cost bh to randomly
sample a mass h of workers from the population of workers looking for a job in that sector. The
search cost b depends on the labor market conditions, as described further below.
We follow Helpman and Itskhoki (2009a) and Helpman et al. (2008a) in making the simplifying
assumption that workers do not know their own skills when looking for a job. As a result the initial
distribution of skills in the worker population will be inherited by the mass of workers looking
for a job in each sector.19 We also assume that worker￿ s skills are not observable to the ￿rm
when hiring. The combination of these assumptions yields no sorting between workers and ￿rms.
Although analytically convenient, these assumptions certainly deserve a discussion. We o⁄er two








18We should note that it is not possible to obtain both constant returns to mass of workers and ability without






￿. We give priority to maintaining constant returns to ability because we do not want to
confound the degree of complementarity with di⁄erential returns to aggregate ability in di⁄erent sectors. Grossman
and Maggi (2000) discuss this as another case in which the distribution of ability matters and Bougheas and Riezman
(2007) explicitly model this aspect in a di⁄erent framework.
19An alternative interpretation is that workers are aware of their own ability, but are ex-ante ignorant about the
distribution of wages in all sectors (including the numeraire), except for the expected wage and the probability of
unemployment.
10ways of interpreting random matching. First, it might be the case that productivity in a speci￿c job
mainly depends on the ￿rm-worker match and this might be unknown to the worker and to the ￿rm
until production takes place. Second, skills might be partially observable by both ￿rms and workers,
which corresponds to the case analyzed by GM. They have shown that if skills are fully observable
and production functions are supermodular, workers of identical skills are matched together, and
countries with di⁄erent skill distributions do not trade. If we allowed skills to be partially observable
in our model we would obtain that ￿rms only hire workers of identical observable skills. Therefore
we can interpret our case of unobservable skills as a residual of overall skills, when we take out the
observable component. For consistency with this, the empirical analysis will employ a measure of
skills purged of all observables.
Although the distribution of workers￿skills ~ g (a) could potentially be sector speci￿c, random
matching implies that every ￿rm, in every sector ￿, in country c inherits the skill distribution in
the general population:20
~ g (a) = g (a;c)
2.4 Skill Dispersion as Comparative Advantage
Given that ￿rms and workers match randomly with respect to unobservable skills, in this section
we discuss how di⁄erent skill distributions across countries generate comparative advantage in this
world. To facilitate the discussion we rewrite the production function in (2) as y = h
1
￿A(￿;c)






20We do not allow ￿rms to screen workers as in Helpman et al. (2008a). We note that, contrary to the case described
by Helpman et al. (2008a), with our choice of production function, ￿rms would not want to screen workers even if the
technology to screen were available, because the marginal product of an additional worker is always positive. This is
the case because of the static problem we are analyzing. In a dynamic framework we would expect ￿rms to lay o⁄
unproductive workers and replace them with potentially more productive ones.
11We loosely refer to A(￿;c) as ￿ productivity￿ , although clearly this is not the result of countries
having access to di⁄erent technologies. The magnitude of A(￿;c) depends on a combination of a
country-speci￿c skill distribution and a sector-speci￿c level of complementarity across skills. We
are interested in how the pattern of comparative advantage, i.e. the relative A￿ s, are a⁄ected by
the distribution of skills.
The general idea we explore is whether countries with lower dispersion in the distribution of
skills have a comparative advantage in sectors with high degree of complementarity, i.e. where it
is relatively more important to employ workers with similar skills. Since the A￿ s exhibit constant
returns to skills, a proportional increase in the skills of all workers increases the A by the same
proportion and does not a⁄ect comparative advantage. Therefore we concentrate on comparing
A￿ s across countries that have the same average skills and di⁄erent dispersion.21 We ￿rst state a
general condition for a speci￿c pattern of comparative advantage to emerge as a result of di⁄erences
in the distribution of skills.
Property 1 If countries are ordered so that, if c < c0, then country c0 is characterized by a
skill distribution g (a;c0) that is a mean-preserving spread of the skill distribution g (a;c) in country











Having stated the general property that we are interested in, we now study under which con-
ditions Property 1 holds. As GM suggest,22 a general result of this type cannot be established.
Because our ultimate goal is to derive empirical implications, we take three di⁄erent approaches
21Note that changes in the average ability that are not the result of a multiplicative change in all abilities will
a⁄ect the pattern of comparative advantage.
22See p.1271.
12to studying this problem. First, we show that comparative advantage can be established for any
distribution if we place bounds on the degree of complementarity ￿. Second, we perform compara-
tive statics assuming speci￿c distributions of skills. Third, we construct A(￿;c) using the empirical
distribution of IALS scores, our proxy for skills.
Our ￿rst approach yields a general result based on restrictions on the degree of complementarity
and on the upper bound of the support of the skill distribution.23
Proposition 1 Property 1 holds, i.e. a country c0 with a more dispersed skill distribution than
country c has a comparative advantage in sectors with lower complementarity (higher ￿) under the
following su¢ cient conditions:
(i) Skill is bounded from above by amax








In our second approach to studying Property 1 we relax the conditions on complementarity at
the cost of concentrating on speci￿c distributions. We can only consider continuous distributions
that are characterized by at least two parameters (in order to be able to consider mean-preserving
increases in dispersion) and are de￿ned on a positive support.
Proposition 2 If skills are distributed according to a Pareto or Log-normal distribution then, if
country c and c0 are characterized by skill distributions g (a;c) and g (a;c0) such that g (a;c0) has
equal mean and higher variance than g (a;c) and if ￿ < ￿0 then Property 1 holds, i.e. country c0
has a comparative advantage in ￿0.
23Imposing an upper bound on a is realistic because it means we do not admit the existence of in￿nitely productive
workers.
13While Proposition 2 establishes an analytical result, we have also numerically computed the
A￿ s for the following distributions: uniform, triangular, gamma, beta and inverse gaussian. For all
these distributions, and for a wide range of parameters, we cannot ￿nd a violation of the ranking
in (3).24
In our third approach we compute the A￿ s for di⁄erent countries and sectors employing the
empirical distributions of IALS log-scores. We verify that Property 1 holds. For a grid of 100 ￿￿ s in
the [0;1] interval, we calculate the ratio of
A(￿;c0)
A(￿;c) where c0 has higher skill dispersion than country
c according to the coe¢ cient of variation of scores. We then regress this ratio on ￿ and ￿nd that,
in 169 out of 171 possible pairs of countries, the gradient is positive and strongly signi￿cant, in
agreement with equation (3).25
2.5 The Firm Problem and Bargaining
This section analyzes the problem of a representative Home ￿rm in a given sector. Analogous
expressions can be derived for a Foreign ￿rm. Firms can sell in the domestic market or export,
facing a transport cost. The transport cost ￿ is of the iceberg type, so that ￿rms have to ship ￿ > 1
units of good in order for one unit to arrive. We denote by xcc0 a variable x originating in market
c and destined for market c0. We drop the sector index to simplify notation.
A Home ￿rm must decide how much to produce for the Home and Foreign market and, since
it maximizes pro￿ts, it equates marginal revenues across the two markets. This allows us to write
24A violation of the ranking can be engineered using a result by Ross (1981). The intuition is the following. Ross
(1981) shows that, if we adopt the Arrow-Debreu de￿nition of risk aversion, then, starting from a given lottery, we
might ￿nd the counterintuitive result that a more risk-averse individual is willing to pay less than a less risk-averse
individual to avoid an an increase in risk in the sense of a mean-preserving spread. We can view our A as the certainty
equivalent of lottery g for an individual with Bernoulli utility u(a) = a
￿, 0 < ￿ < 1. Individuals with lower ￿ are
more risk averse in the Arrow-Pratt sense. In our case we can show, using the example proposed by Ross (1981)
that, with a mean-preserving spread, the certainty equivalent of a more risk averse individual drops proportionately
by less than for a less risk averse individual. Details are available from the authors.
25Numerical results and details of all these exercises are available from the authors.










￿ and Bc = PcQ
1
￿
c for c = H;F. 26 The ￿rm must
then simply choose the total amount of output to produce and therefore how many workers to
employ. In this decision it takes into account how much workers are paid.
Because of the presence of search frictions, once workers are hired they are not interchangeable
with outside workers and we assume that the ￿rm and all workers employed engage in bargaining
to share the surplus created. We assume that the intra-￿rm bargaining is of the type described
by Stole and Zwiebel (1996), with the workers having unemployment as outside option, which we
assume yields a payo⁄ of zero. Stole and Zwiebel show that the bargaining solution yields payo⁄s
that correspond to the Shapley value. We discuss wages in the following section, while here we
show that the bargaining outcome for a ￿rm with revenues r is given by sr, where:
s =
￿￿
￿ (1 + ￿) ￿ 1
: (5)
Given the expression for total revenues in (4), the ￿rm static problem27 reduces to choosing









￿ ￿H ￿ bh ￿ f: (6)

















￿￿1 and some algebraic manipulation lead to (4), similarly to Helpman and Itskhoki
(2009a).
27For a dynamic extension of this type of framework see Helpman and Itskhoki (2009b).
15This is a concave problem because of the restriction placed on ￿ in (2). Since this is a standard
problem we refer to the Appendix for details of the derivation, and report here the main results.







￿. Intuitively, output is increasing in productivity A, the size of the
￿xed cost f, and the elasticity of demand ￿, while it decreases with the hiring cost b.28 We assume







￿ ￿ 8￿ (7)
otherwise the amount produced is zero. Under condition (7) we can derive how much output is
produced for the domestic and export market, yHH and yHF respectively (see Appendix). As
standard with iso-elastic demand, the producer price is constant across markets and for a Home
￿rm is equal to pH =
￿
￿AH where ￿ (￿) = f ￿￿+￿￿1
￿￿￿￿+1. The consumer price in the export market is





In the Appendix we derive revenues accruing to ￿rms in all markets. We focus attention here on










28The hiring cost depends on tightness of the labor market x, and is assumed to take the same form as in Helpman
and Itskhoki (2009a) and Helpman et al. (2008a): b = ￿0x
￿1. We refer to these papers for a discussion. We similarly




16Intuitively, relative revenues increase in relative productivity, as predicted by comparative advan-
tage. In the next section we solve for the mass of ￿rms, which is the ￿nal step in the determination
of trade ￿ ows.
2.6 Trade Flows
In Section 2.5 we derived the amount of output sold by each ￿rm in the domestic and export market.
In order to determine trade ￿ ows we need to calculate the equilibrium mass of ￿rms for country
c and sector ￿, Mc (￿). The derivation is presented in the Appendix. We remark that, similarly
to other models of monopolistic competition with trade costs (Helpman and Krugman, 1985), the
presence of a home-market e⁄ect requires that we restrict the degree of asymmetry in country sizes
to prevent all ￿rms from locating in one country. De￿ne relative population in Home as ￿ ￿ LH
LF .
We impose throughout the restrictions that ￿low < ￿ < ￿up. If the condition is violated for some
industries, we expect to observe no production and no exports.29 If the condition is satis￿ed, then
the following proposition establishes a link between comparative advantage and equilibrium entry.
Proposition 3 Under the condition that country sizes are su¢ ciently similar, i.e. ￿low < ￿ < ￿up,
the equilibrium mass of ￿rms in country H relative to country F in sector ￿0 is higher than in





















29As equations (A-19) and (A-20) establish, the conditions for a positive mass of ￿rms depend on size, but also on
comparative advantage. If a country is relatively more productive it can a⁄ord to be smaller in size and still have a
positive mass of ￿rms. In this sense our model also predicts an extensive margin of trade (whether we observe or not
trade between two countries) based on comparative advantage, albeit a very stark one. Di⁄erently from models with
heterogeneous ￿rms, e.g. Helpman et al. (2008c), in this setup the assumption of identical ￿rms implies that either
￿rms exist and export or they do neither.
17Since trade ￿ ows are completely determined by the amount sold in the export market by each
￿rm and by the number of ￿rms, we now show that the value of exports is relatively higher in
comparative advantage industries. In the previous section we have established that comparative
advantage is determined by a combination of sector characteristics (the degree of complementarity
￿) and country characteristics (the dispersion of skills in the population). The following proposition
summarizes the previous discussion and represents the main result of this section. We denote the
value of total sales by ￿rms from country c in market c0, as Xcc0. Relative total sales of good ￿ by







Proposition 4 Under Property 1, a country with relatively higher dispersion of skills has a com-
parative advantage, and therefore exports relatively more to any destination, in sectors with high
degree of substitutability ￿.
The next section provides a bridge to the empirical section by extending the model to a multi-
country world.
3 Multi-Country Model
The goal of this section is to generalize the model to many countries and provide the conditions
under which the main result of the two-country model holds, i.e. countries with relatively higher
dispersion of skills have a comparative advantage, and therefore export relatively more, in sectors
where the dispersion of wages is higher.
Without loss of generality we consider three countries, so that c 2 fH;F;Gg. Following HMR,
18we allow transport costs to be country-pair speci￿c and asymmetric, i.e. ￿HF 6= ￿FH. We ￿x as
destination market country F and express the value of exports of good ￿ by country H relative to






While the determination of relative revenues of individual ￿rms rHF=rGF is straightforward, the
equilibrium mass of ￿rms can be computed, but not easily characterized, with more than two
asymmetric countries. This is a known problem in the home-market e⁄ect literature.30 Therefore
in the following proposition we limit ourselves to imposing that the relative mass of ￿rms be non-
decreasing in relative productivity. This is reasonable if we believe that, in equilibrium, entry is
relatively higher in sectors where a country has a comparative advantage.
Proposition 5 Under Property 1, if the relative mass of ￿rms
MH(￿)
MG(￿) is non-decreasing in relative
productivity
A(￿;H)
A(￿;G) then a country with relatively higher dispersion of skills has a comparative
advantage, and therefore exports relatively more to any destination, in sectors with higher degree of
substitutability ￿.
3.1 Wage Distribution and Complementarity
The previous sections establish the direction and magnitude of trade ￿ ows based on comparative
advantage, which results from a combination of sector characteristics (the parameter ￿) and country
characteristics (skill dispersion). While we have measures that approximate the degree of skill
dispersion at the country level, we are not aware of any measures of the elasticity of substitution
among individuals￿skills in di⁄erent sectors. Therefore we take the theoretical model as a guide
30Behrens et al. (2009) show that the home-market e⁄ect intuition does not easily generalize to the case of more
than two countries. Our case of multiple countries with productivity di⁄erences further complicates the problem and
is beyond the scope of this paper.
19to ￿nding a proxy for the degree of complementarity. This section establishes a one-to-one link
between the degree of complementarity and the dispersion of wages in sector ￿, which can be
measured in the data.
We assume that at the bargaining and production stage workers￿skills are fully revealed, so that
workers of di⁄erent skills receive di⁄erent wages as a result of intra-￿rm bargaining. Although the
assumption that skill is perfectly revealed only at the production and bargaining stage is stark, we
believe it captures some realistic features of the hiring process, where workers￿skills in particular
tasks are di¢ cult to assess until they start working. Moreover, even if skills were partially revealed
at the production stage, as long as the portion revealed were constant across sectors, this would
not substantially change the implications we are about to discuss.
The Appendix shows the calculation of the Shapley value for a worker of skill a. Since the
average wage also di⁄ers across sectors, we normalize the wage of a worker of skill a in sector ￿ by
the average wage in the sector. The normalized wage is e w(a;￿) = a￿
E(a￿), which re￿ ects the marginal
product of a worker of skill a when added to the production team and depends on ￿. The higher
the substitutability across workers the larger the marginal product of a worker with high skills.
In contrast, if ￿ is low, i.e. complementarity is high, a worker of high skills has a relatively lower
marginal product because her skills are very di⁄erent from the average skills of her team-mates.
An implication of this wage structure is that workers with identical skills, but employed in di⁄erent
sectors, generally receive di⁄erent wages, as returns to skills vary across industries.31
Keeping in mind that the distribution of skills is the same in every industry, the distribu-
tion of wages within a sector depends, in our framework, exclusively on technological factors that
determine the marginal product of workers with di⁄erent skills. It therefore does not re￿ ect compo-
31The point is made by Heckman and Scheinkman (1987), who show that returns to unobservable characteristics
are di⁄erent across sectors.
20sitional di⁄erences across sectors. The following proposition establishes that there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the dispersion of wages and the degree of complementarity.
Proposition 6 For any non-degenerate distribution of skills g (a;c), the following three measures
of dispersion of sectoral wages are strictly increasing in the degree of substitutability of workers￿
skills, ￿: (i) the Coe¢ cient of Variation; (ii) the Gini Coe¢ cient and (iii) the Inter-Percentile
Ratio32
Proposition 6 establishes that the more complementary workers are, the more compressed the
wage distribution is. The intuition follows from our discussion of normalized wages.
4 Empirical Analysis
Section 3 extended the two-country model to the case of many countries. The objective of this
section is to assess the empirical relevance of Proposition 5. A di¢ culty comes from the fact that
the elasticity of substitution of individuals￿skills at the industry level is not observable in the data.
However, combining results from Propositions 5 and 6, it is possible to derive the following testable
implication of our model:
Corollary 7 Under Property 1, if the relative mass of ￿rms is non-decreasing in relative produc-
tivity, then a country with a relatively higher skill dispersion has a comparative advantage, and
therefore exports relatively more to any destination, in sectors where the dispersion of wages is
higher.
Proof. Follows immediately from Propositions 5 and 6.
32The Interpercentile-Ratio, IPRkj, is de￿ned as IPRkj =
wk
wj , where wk (wj) is the wage of the worker at the
k
th(j
th) percentile of the sectoral wage distribution and j < k.
21Next we present the estimation framework. Section 4.2 describes the data and section 4.3
reports baseline results. Finally, Section 4.4 discusses identi￿cation and presents robustness checks.
4.1 Estimation Framework
As a ￿rst step to design an empirical test of Corollary 7 we combine equations (1) and (8) to obtain
the following expression for the value of (log) exports of good i from country H to country F,
XHF (i):33
logXHF (i) = (￿ ￿ 1)logA(i;H) + logMH (i) ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)log￿HF (11)
+log￿(i) + logEF ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)PF (i) + (￿ ￿ 1)log
￿(i)
￿ (i)
where A(i;H) captures comparative advantage of the exporting country, MH (i) the mass of ￿rms in
the exporting country, ￿HF transport costs between the two countries, PF (i) an industry-importer
speci￿c price index, EF the importing country total expenditure and ￿(i), ￿ (i) and ￿(i) industry-
speci￿c constants. Since we analyze a discrete number of industries, in the remainder of this section
we use subscript i to index variables that vary across industries.
An ideal test of Corollary 7 would require quantifying the e⁄ect of a mean-preserving spread
in the distribution of skills in country H on its relative exports to country F, as a function of
the elasticity of substitution in each sector i. These e⁄ects operate through AHi in equation 11.
Although MHi is not observable, the model shows it is also a function of AHi. Therefore, in order
to derive an estimation equation for logXHFi, we assume that (￿ ￿ 1)logAHi + logMHi can be
33The value of total exports of i from H to F is given by:





where pHF (i) =
￿(i)￿HF
￿(i)A(i;H).
22written as an additive function of industry characteristics (￿i), exporter characteristics (￿H), an
interaction between a measure of wage dispersion in industry i (WageDispi) and a measure of
skill dispersion in country H (SkillDispH), and other unobservable determinants of comparative
advantage in country H (￿Hi),34
(￿ ￿ 1)logAHi + logMHi = ￿WageDispi ￿ SkillDispH + ￿i + ￿H + ￿Hi
Transport costs are allowed to depend linearly on a vector of observable country-pair bilateral
trade barriers (dHF) and unmeasured i.i.d. trade frictions (uHF). A set of industry-importer
speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects (￿Fi) controls non-parametrically for the price index PFi, industry constants
￿i
￿i and ￿i. Finally, let ￿HFi capture measurement errors in trade ￿ ows and the e⁄ect of other
unobserved determinants of XHFi.
With this speci￿cation, the estimation equation for exports logXHFi takes the following form:
logXHFi = ￿WageDispi ￿ SkillDispH + ￿dHF + ￿H + ￿Fi + "HFi (12)
where "HFi = ￿Hi+ uHF + ￿HFi.
The variable of interest is WageDispi ￿ SkillDispH and estimation of its coe¢ cient ￿ allows
us to test Corollary 7. To see why, assume that equation (12) correctly speci￿es a model for the
conditional expectation of logXHFi, so that E ["HFijWageDispi ￿ SkillDispH;dHF;￿H;￿Fi] = 0.














= ￿￿ijWageDisp ￿ ￿HGSkillDisp (13)
34Note that AHi may also depend on the mean and other moments of the skill distribution of country H and these
could potentially have di⁄erent e⁄ect on productivity in di⁄erent industries, a possibility that we explicitly consider
in the empirical analysis of trade ￿ ows. These e⁄ects are summarized by ￿Hi.
23where ￿HGSkillDisp ￿ SkillDispH ￿SkillDispG and ￿ijWageDisp is similarly de￿ned. Accord-
ing to (13), Corollary 7 implies ￿ > 0.
4.2 Data
Before presenting the estimation results we brie￿ y describe the measurement of the two key explana-
tory variables in the empirical analysis, skill dispersion at the country level and wage dispersion at
the industry level. A detailed discussion of all data can be found in the Appendix.
4.2.1 Skill Dispersion
We use test scores from the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) to approximate the skill
distribution within a country. Collaborators in this household survey administered a common test
of work-related literacy skills to a large sample of adults between the ages of 16 and 65 in 19
countries. The IALS focuses on literacy skills that are needed for everyday tasks (e.g. working out
a tip, calculating interest on a loan and extracting information), across three di⁄erent dimensions of
literacy: quantitative, prose and document literacy. We combine the results of these three tests into
a single average score for each individual, measured on a scale from 0 to 500. The skill distribution
is proxied by the distribution of log-scores of individuals participating in the labor market and
living in the same country.
To insure consistency with the theoretical assumption of imperfect skill observability, we con-
struct a measure of residual scores dispersion within countries. For an individual k participating in
the labor market of country H, we obtain the estimated residual d ￿kH from the following regression:
log(skH) = XkH￿H + ￿kH (14)
24where skH is the IALS score of k and XkH is a vector of individual demographic information from
the IALS questionnaire. The residual d ￿kH is then used to compute the skill dispersion measures
used for the estimation of trade ￿ ows.
Table 1 ranks 19 countries according to the coe¢ cient of variation (CV) of IALS scores, and also
reports their rank by mean, standard deviation (St Dev) and standard deviation of residual IALS
(St Dev Resid). The ￿gures show di⁄erent dispersion in countries at similar stages of development:
for example, we observe a more spread distribution of skills in the US, UK and Canada, than in
Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany.35
4.2.2 Wage Dispersion
We use the 5% Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) ￿les of the 2000 Census of Population
in the United States to construct industry-speci￿c measures of wage dispersion to be used as
proxies for the unobserved elasticity of substitution. An advantage of our approach is that we can
match individual wage observations to a detailed industry classi￿cation, accounting for the entire
manufacturing sector36. As shown in table 2, this procedure results in 63 industries for which both
wage dispersion and international trade ￿ ows can be computed, at a level of aggregation between
the 3 and 4 digit levels of the 1997 North American Industry Classi￿cation System (NAICS).
As with IALS scores, we focus on residual wage dispersion. We start by removing variation in
wages driven by a set of individual characteristics on which ￿rms can typically condition employment
decisions. Then, we adapt the correction method proposed in Dahl (2002) to address the possibly
non-random selection of workers into multiple industries. In essence, this procedure controls for
35Brown et al. (2007) report similar variation in skill distributions in a comprehensive study using IALS, the
1995, 1999 and 2003 Trends in International Maths and Science Study (TIMSS), the 2000 and 2003 Programme for
International Student Assessment (PISA) and the 2001 Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS).
36This is not feasible for IALS data, since individual observations are assigned a broad sectoral classi￿cation
(e.g. agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, etc), while international trade data is available only for
manufacturing industries.
25selection e⁄ects using di⁄erences in the probabilities of being observed in a given industry due to
exogenous variation, such as the state of birth of two people, who are otherwise similar in terms of
education, experience, household structure, race and gender. Details are provided in the Appendix.
For an individual k employed in industry i, we obtain the estimated residual c ￿
ki from the
following regression:
log(wki) = Zki￿i + ￿ki (15)
where wki is the weekly wage of k and Zki is a vector of observable characteristics. Note that we
run these regressions separately for each industry to allow for changes in the return to observable
characteristics across industries.37 Table 2 shows the ranking of di⁄erent industries by standard
deviation of raw and residual wages. It is apparent that dispersion varies signi￿cantly across
sectors. For example, in terms of the standard deviation of wages, the three lowest ranked sectors
are non-ferrous metal processing, railroad, and ￿ber mills. The three highest ranked are cosmetics,
computer and electronic manufacturing.
The use of U.S. estimates as proxies for within-industry wage dispersion (and skill substitutabil-
ity) in other countries is warranted if they have access to similar production technologies.38 Equal
access to technology implies that the elasticity of substitution in any given industry will be constant
across countries. As a result, the ranking of industries according to wage dispersion will be the
same within each country, a hypothesis that is not easy to verify due to the scarcity of publicly
available microdata with similar sector classi￿cation. However, we do perform this exercise for
the U.S. and Canada. We compute the sectoral dispersion of wage residuals in Canada to verify
37Regression results are available upon request.
38The assumption that industry-speci￿c characteristics computed for the United States also apply to industries in
other countries is not an unusual one in the recent empirical trade literature on comparative advantage. Examples
include the measurement of ￿nancial vulnerability (Manova, 2008b), the importance of relationship-speci￿c investment
(Nunn, 2007), ￿rm-speci￿c skill intensity (Tang, 2008) and the variance of ￿rm-speci￿c shocks (Cuæat and Melitz,
2007).
26whether the ranking is similar to the one prevailing in the US.39 To maximize comparability, we
are careful to control for the same set of observable characteristics of workers in both countries
when computing the residuals, use similar sampling criteria and the same industry classi￿cation.
Figure 2 shows the standard deviation of the wage residuals in the two countries by industry. The
positive slope of the ￿tted line is signi￿cant at the 5% level. Clearly, the sectoral ranking of residual
dispersion in the US is strongly correlated to the one observed in Canada. Sectors like computers
and clothing exhibit higher dispersion in both countries, compared to sectors like machinery and
paper manufacturing.
4.3 Baseline Results
This section discusses results of the empirical analysis of trade ￿ ows using speci￿cation (12). The
dependent variable in tables 3 to 5 is the log of exports from country H to country F in industry
i. Our data set contains the value of exports in year 2000 from 19 exporters to 145 importers in 63
industries. Table 3 reports estimates of the impact of skill dispersion as proxied by the dispersion
of (raw) test scores: we identify this e⁄ect through an interaction with (raw) wages dispersion.40
For comparability, all tables report standardized coe¢ cients of the explanatory variables. We show
results based on three alternative measures of dispersion: the 95-5 interpercentile range divided
by the average in column (1), the Gini relative mean di⁄erence (i.e. twice the Gini coe¢ cient) in
column (2) and the coe¢ cient of variation in column (3).41 Columns (1)-(3) add exporter, importer
and industry dummies to our variables of interest; columns (4)-(6) include theoretically consistent
exporter and importer-industry dummies, along with a vector of bilateral trade barriers described
39We use the Canadian Labor Force Survey data for May 2000. Details of this exercise are available upon request.
40Raw measures are not purged of the e⁄ect of observable characteristics.
41We note that all three measures have a common structure in that the numerator is a measure of dispersion (the
95-5 interpercentile range, the standard deviation and the Gini mean di⁄erence) while the denominator is the average
of the variable. Since we are using the logarithm of variables, the reason why we employ measures of dispersion
divided by the average is not for rescaling, but rather to parsimoniously control for the e⁄ect that the interaction of
the averages might have on trade ￿ ows.
27in the Appendix.
In all speci￿cations the estimated interaction WageDispi ￿ SkillDispH shows a positive e⁄ect
on exports, signi￿cant throughout at the 5% level. The reported coe¢ cients imply that a one
standard deviation increase in the value of the interaction raises log exports by anywhere between
10:7% and 19:3% standard deviations.42 We postpone a detailed discussion of magnitudes to later
in this Section.
Table 4 reproduces the structure of table 3 in terms of controls, but it separately reports
the e⁄ect of the interaction WageDispi ￿ SkillDispH (where the measure of dispersion is not
divided by the average), as well as those of the interaction of average scores and average wages,
WageMeani ￿ SkillMeanH, and of the other two interactions, WageDispi ￿ SkillMeanH and
WageMeani ￿SkillDispH. The interaction of the averages is expected to capture standard factor
proportions e⁄ects: on average, countries with more skilled workers specialize in sectors that employ
skilled workers and have higher average wages. The interaction WageMeani ￿ SkillDispH is a
￿ exible way to control for possible bias, due to di⁄erences in sectoral average wages, in the estimated
e⁄ect of our interaction of interest. The interaction WageDispi￿SkillMeanH plays a similar role.43
In general, columns (1)-(6) suggest that the coe¢ cient of WageDispi￿SkillDispH is robust to the
inclusion of all interactions: all estimates are similar to the ones in table 3 and, with the exception
of one case, signi￿cant at the 5% level. As for the other interactions, as expected WageMeani ￿
SkillMeanH has a strong and positive impact on trade ￿ ows. Moreover WageMeani￿ SkillDispH
is consistently positive, signi￿cant and large, while WageDispi ￿ SkillMeanH is positive, but not
always signi￿cant, particularly in columns (1)-(3).
42In regressions we do not report, we interacted all measures of dispersion for wages and scores with one another
obtaining results qualitatively and quantitatively similar to columns (1)-(6).
43This interaction relates to the theoretical prediction that increases in average skills not resulting from propor-
tional changes also have an e⁄ect on comparative advantage. This e⁄ect depends on the degree of complementarity,
approximated by WageDispi.
28Table 5 has a structure similar to tables 3 and 4, but it employs measures of residual wage and
residual skill dispersion, as de￿ned in sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.1. In this speci￿cation we do not control
for averages, since they are zero by construction. The measures of dispersion employed in table 5
are: the 95-5 interpercentile range in column (1) and (4), the Gini mean di⁄erence in column (2) and
(5) and the standard deviation in column (3) and (6). Again, we ￿nd that WageDispi￿SkillDispH
has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on exports.44 We note that the magnitudes are similar to the
coe¢ cients in tables 3 and 4, indicating a substantial degree of robustness in our results. The
standardized coe¢ cient of WageDispi ￿ SkillDispH varies between 10:4% and 23% in the six
speci￿cations.
Finally, we employ the estimated coe¢ cients to gauge the economic magnitude of this source of
comparative advantage. The standardized coe¢ cient of WageDispi ￿SkillDispH is similar across
speci￿cations. Our baseline estimate is 0.23 (column 4, table 5). Consider two countries, the US
and Canada, and two sectors, ￿ computers￿and ￿ paper mills￿ . These countries and sectors are chosen
because, going from paper mills￿ s WageDisp interacted with Canada￿ s SkillDisp to computers￿ s
WageDisp interacted with the US SkillDisp, the interaction WageDispi ￿ SkillDispH increases
by approximately one standard deviation. Since the standard deviation of log exports is 2:204 the







This implies that, averaging across destination markets, the US exports of computers relative to
Canada are 66% higher than the US exports of paper products relative to Canada (this number is
26% if we employ the lowest estimate in table 5).
44In column (6) the interaction is signicant at the 6% level.
294.4 Identi￿cation and Robustness
In this section we discuss some potential issues related to the identi￿cation of the e⁄ects quanti￿ed
in tables 3, 4 and 5.
4.4.1 The Extensive Margin of Trade: Selection
Tables 3, 4, and 5 report estimation results which do not take into account the fact that a substantial
fraction of bilateral trade ￿ ows are zero and that trade ￿ ows re￿ ect both an intensive margin (the
amount exported by each ￿rm) and an extensive margin (the number of ￿rms exporting, possibly
zero). The estimation of (12) requires excluding observations for countries which do not trade
in speci￿c industries. These amount to 66.5% of the sample. As discussed in HMR, selection of
trading partners induces a negative correlation between observed and unobserved trade barriers
(dHF and uHF) that might bias OLS estimates in (12), including ￿.
In order to correct for selection bias, we implement a two-step estimation procedure: in the ￿rst
step we account for the discrete export decision using a linear probability model and obtain the
predicted probabilities of observing positive exports, [ ’HFi; in the second stage, equation (12) is
estimated including a ￿ exible polynomial of degree four in [ ’HFi to control for selection bias.45 For
identi￿cation not to rely on the non-linearity of [ ’HFi one needs to identify a source of variation
which a⁄ects the discrete choice of engaging in exports without changing the intensity of trade ￿ ows.
HMR argue that cross-country variation in start-up regulation costs likely relates to the decision to
export, and it has no bearing on the intensive margin. The economic rationale lies in the fact that
start-up costs in the exporting country, as well as in the importing one, a⁄ect ￿xed rather than
variable costs of trade. Di⁄erent forces can be at work and the nature and strength of this e⁄ect
45We favor using a linear probability model in the ￿rst stage since its two most common alternatives, probit and logit
models, su⁄er di⁄erent problems in the current application. The probit model with ￿xed e⁄ects yields inconsistent
estimates. In turn, estimating a ￿xed e⁄ects logit becomes computationally very costly due to the large number of
￿xed e⁄ects required by our speci￿cation of equation (12).
30may depend on characteristics of both exporting and importing countries. For example, HMR ￿nd
that start-up regulation costs are an e⁄ective predictor of the extensive export decision and that
the interaction between home and foreign regulation costs has a negative gradient on the likelihood
to export. On the other hand, De Groot et al. (2004) show that di⁄erences in institutional factors,
including di⁄erences in regulation and red tape, have large e⁄ects on trade ￿ ows; their work unveils
an alternative channel through which regulation can a⁄ect trade, and stresses the importance of
￿ similarity￿in institutional frameworks.
An analysis of the ￿rst-stage bilateral export decisions (see table 7 in the Appendix) uncovers
strong e⁄ects of regulation costs. We use exporter-importer interactions of three proxies of regula-
tion costs: the number of days (RegDaysH￿RegDaysF), number of legal procedures (RegProcH￿
RegProcF) and relative cost, as a percentage of GDP per capita (RegProcH ￿ RegProcF), for an
entrepreneur to start operating a business.46 We ￿nd that these proxies are signi￿cant predictors
of selection into exporting and that the direction of the e⁄ect changes by country characteristics;
in fact, as might be expected, we ￿nd that regulatory costs tend to have a direct negative e⁄ect
on export choices, but also that relative di⁄erences across countries do matter, and can lead to
positive interaction e⁄ects.47
In table 6 we report the second-stage obtained using the selection correction. To facilitate
comparison, column (1) of table 6 is identical to column (4) of table 5, which is the baseline result.
Throughout this table we employ only one of the three measures of dispersion, i.e. the standard
deviation.48 Columns (2)-(6) report the second stage of the selection-corrected estimation. Column
(2) documents the robustness of the e⁄ect associated to the interaction WageDispi ￿SkillDispH:
46To test the overidentifying restrictions we performed a Hausman test comparing second stage estimates using all
three instruments to the corresponding estimates using only a subset of them. We tested all possible combinations of
exclusion restrictions and in no case could we reject the null hypothesis that they are valid and, therefore, estimates
with di⁄erent restrictions only di⁄er as a result of sampling error.
47Additional details available from the authors.
48The same qualitative results emerge if we employ the other two measures of dispersion.
31the standardized coe¢ cient is essentially unchanged at 0:212.
4.4.2 Omitted Determinants of Comparative Advantage
A second potential source of bias is due to the omission of other determinants of comparative
advantage, possibly correlated to our variable of interest. Suppose that the true model includes an
additional term niZH. If WageDispi were correlated with ni and SkillDispH were correlated with
ZH, the OLS estimate of ￿ in equation (12) would be inconsistent. As an example, industries with
lower dispersion of wages tend to be capital intensive. Similarly, exporters with low skill dispersion
tend to be relatively abundant in aggregate physical capital.49 In this case, comparative advantage
driven by skill dispersion is correlated with comparative advantage deriving from standard factor
proportions theory.
Columns (3) to (5) of table 6 show that the estimated e⁄ect of the interaction WageDispi ￿
SkillDispH is robust to a number of controls for other potential determinants of comparative advan-
tage. Column (3) introduces controls for standard Heckscher-Ohlin sources of comparative advan-
tage: the interaction of factor endowment of a country (in particular human capital, SkillEndowH
and physical capital, KEndowH) and factor intensity of the sector (human capital SkillIntensi and
physical capital, KIntensi), as in Romalis (2004). Looking at 95% con￿dence intervals, the impact
on trade ￿ ows of our variable of interest WageDispi ￿ SkillDispH is quantitatively similar to the
interaction KIntensi￿KEndowH and slightly larger than SkillIntensi￿SkillEndowH. In column
(4) we control for the interaction between the standard deviation of ￿rm size within industry i,
FirmDispi, and SkillDispH. With this interaction we explore a potential alternative mechanism
that might be driving our result. In particular, if entry in sectors with high ￿rm size dispersion is
49In our dataset, the correlation between the coe¢ cient of dispersion of residual wages and physical capital intensity
across industries is -0.511. In turn, the correlation between the standard deviation of residual IALS scores and physical
capital abundance across exporters is -0.524.
32higher in countries with high skill dispersion (because of higher possibility of assortative matching
between ￿rms and workers) then we would expect a positive e⁄ect of FirmDispi￿ SkillDispH on
trade ￿ ows. However, this alternative control does not substantially a⁄ect the magnitude and sig-
ni￿cance of our variable of interest and has very little explanatory power for trade ￿ ows. In column
(5) we introduce the share of individual wages that are top-coded within an industry, TopCodei,
interacted with SkillDispH, and we show that our result is not driven by the fact that some sectors
rely on ￿ super-stars￿(those sectors that have a high share of top-coded wages). This suggests that
more than one aspect of the dispersion of the distribution of wages is driving the result, and the
overall shape of the distribution seems to be better captured by broader measures of dispersion.
4.4.3 Reverse Causality
Finally, WageDispi and SkillDispH might be partly in￿ uenced by the pattern of international
trade, potentially resulting in reverse causality. We explore this possibility by examining the rela-
tionship between each of these two variables and the error term "HFi. The orthogonality condition
needed for consistent estimation of ￿ in equation (12) is:
E (WageDisps ￿ SkillDispc ￿ "HFi) = 0 8s;c (16)
By the Law of Iterated Expectations, a su¢ cient condition to obtain identi￿cation is:
E (WageDisps ￿ "HFijSkillDispc) = 0 8s;c (17)
which requires that, for every exporter in our sample, within-industry wage dispersion be uncorre-
lated with unobserved determinants of trade. For example, a violation of (17) would arise if "HFi
33contained the unobserved share of exporting ￿rms in a given sector in H and the proportion of
exporters varied across industries and importers. In a model with heterogeneous ￿rms, Helpman
et al. (2008a) show that within-industry wage dispersion is a function of the proportion of ￿rms
exporting in the industry since, on average, exporters pay higher wages than non-exporters.50 How-
ever, as shown in HMR, the correction for self-selection into the export market discussed in section
4.4.1 e⁄ectively removes this potential bias.
Furthermore, since we measure wage dispersion at the industry level using U.S. data, we can
check the robustness of our estimates by removing the U.S. from our set of exporters. To the
extent that the U.S. wage structure is not signi￿cantly a⁄ected by bilateral trade ￿ ows between
other countries, this procedure substantially decreases the likelihood of feedback e⁄ects running
from trade ￿ ows to WageDisps. Column (6) in table 6 shows that, also in this case, the coe¢ cient
of our interaction of interest maintains the same magnitude and signi￿cance.
An alternative su¢ cient condition that guarantees (16), and therefore identi￿cation of ￿, is
E (SkillDispc ￿ "HFijWageDisps) = 0 8s;c
which means that skill dispersion in every exporting country is uncorrelated with the error term
"HFi,. This condition is satis￿ed if unobserved exporting opportunities captured in "HFi are not
signi￿cantly related to the dispersion, and overall distribution, of residual skills in a country. There
are several reasons to believe that this is plausible. First, the unobserved exporting opportunities
"HFi must occur at levels other than exporter or importer-industry, which are already captured by
our set of dummies. Moreover, since our skill dispersion measures pre-date trade ￿ ows by several
years, the link between "HFi and SkillDispc introduces bias only if: (i) "HFi is a highly persistent
50Exporters do pay higher wages. See, for example, Bernard et al. (1995) and Bernard and Jensen (1997).
34shock to exporting opportunities which is not captured by our dummies and also a⁄ects the long-
term, ￿ residual￿skill distribution, and (ii) the skill distribution reacts very quickly in response to
export shocks. In this respect Glaeser et al. (2004) show that the education system is a slow-
changing characteristic of a country. However, skill dispersion is not only the product of the formal
education system, but may change after school through on-the-job training. A number of papers
have established the relatively limited impact of on-the-job training on the overall level of human
capital.51 Nevertheless, we explicitly account for the possibility that re-training is triggered by
exporting opportunities through the inclusion, in the derivation of residual skills, of a control for
whether a worker was re-trained in the previous year.
5 Conclusions
Relative di⁄erences in the distribution of production factors are central to the classical theory
of international trade. The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson factor proportion model stresses the idea
that di⁄erences in factor endowments play a major role in predicting trade ￿ ows. Comparative
advantage is associated with relatively abundant factors of production: the ￿ average￿endowment
of some important factor can be a driving force in determining international specialization. In this
paper we push this idea further and argue that the whole distribution of factor endowments, rather
than just their average, can help rationalize observed trade ￿ ows. We focus on human capital and
skills, and use industry-level trade data, to show that factors￿dispersion accounts for as much as
relative factors￿proportions in the determination of trade ￿ ows.
First, we develop a theoretical framework where, because of frictions in the labor market and
ex-ante unobservable skills, workers and ￿rms are randomly matched. The skill distribution matters
51See discussion in Carneiro and Heckman (2003) and Adda et al. (2006).
35for di⁄erent sectors because some industries are more capable to substitute workers of di⁄erent skill
than others. All sectors inherit the distribution of (unobserved) skills in the country￿ s population
and, as a result, ￿rms in sectors with higher complementarity are relatively more productive in
countries with lower skill dispersion. Our model provides an observable proxy for the otherwise
unobservable degree of complementarity among workers￿skills, that is the dispersion of wages at
the industry level. Detailed data on industry-level bilateral trade ￿ ows reveal that countries with
higher skill dispersion specialize in high wage dispersion sectors. This empirical ￿nding is robust
to a battery of controls and indicates that the dispersion of human capital is not only statistically
signi￿cant, but also quantitatively large: in fact we ￿nd that the magnitude of its e⁄ect on trade
￿ ows is comparable to that of the aggregate endowment of human capital in a country. Two remarks
about the interpretation of our evidence are in order.
First, although we provide a theoretical framework alternative to GM￿ s, our empirical results
are not inconsistent with their model: we ￿nd that countries with high skill dispersion specialize
in sectors with high wage dispersion. In our model we relate this to technology, in particular
the degree of complementarity among workers￿abilities, which is the only determinant of wage
dispersion, since every sector inherits the distribution of skills in the country￿ s population and
the labor market is characterized by substantial frictions that prevent workers of identical skills
from earning identical wages. Conversely, in GM, labor markets are perfectly competitive and any
di⁄erences in the sectoral wage distribution is due exclusively to industries employing workers of
di⁄erent skills. We expect that a multi-country, multi-sector extension of GM would have testable
implications similar to ours. We are not aware of such an extension and we believe it would be
non-trivial.
Second, we hypothesize that a Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model of factor proportions with
36a large number of factors and di⁄erent factor intensities across sectors would potentially yield
testable implications similar to our model. Our results indicate that such a model should encompass
a much ￿ner level of disaggregation of factors than Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson-type models and
their empirical tests have employed so far.52
Finally, the theoretical framework developed in this paper has implications for the impact of
trade on overall wage inequality, which are beyond the scope of this study. Our model, taken at
face value, implies that a more disperse skill distribution does not just have a direct e⁄ect on the
income distribution, but also an indirect e⁄ect, as countries with higher skill dispersion specialize
in sectors with high wage dispersion. Although we consider this e⁄ect intriguing, we are aware
that our static, stylized description of the labor market is not sophisticated enough to account for
alternative determinants of overall inequality.
A Appendix - Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
By de￿nition of log-supermodularity we need to prove that, if g (a;c0) is a mean-preserving spread























A mean-preserving spread of g (a;c) increases the second term of the right-hand side of (A-1) by
de￿nition, since a￿ is a concave function. A su¢ cient condition for the ￿rst term of (A-1) to increase
with a mean-preserving spread in g (a;c) is that k(a) = a￿ loga is a convex function which is veri￿ed
if its second derivative with respect to a is positive for every value of a. i.e. loga < 2￿￿1
(1￿￿)￿. Since




(1￿￿)￿ = 1 then, if a is bounded above by amax, then there exists a value ￿ < 1 such
that logamax = 2￿￿1
(1￿￿)￿. If ￿ > ￿ then
@ logA(￿;c)
@￿ increases with a mean preserving spread of g (a;c).
52Tests of the factor proportions theory typically involve a dichotomous classi￿cation of workers into production
and non-production, or college and non-college educated.
37A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Pareto Distribution - Under the assumption that skills follow a Pareto distribution with mean
￿ and standard deviation ￿, A takes the following expression:53
A =














Since A is twice di⁄erentiable in ￿ and ￿, the result in Proposition 3 is equivalent to A
being log-supermodular in ￿ and ￿, that is
@2 logA
@￿@￿ > 0. The expression for the cross partial















and ￿ < 1 so A is log-supermodular in ￿ and ￿.
(ii) Log-Normal Distribution - If the distribution of skills a is lognormal on the support [0;1]








It is easy to show that under this distribution, A is log-supermodular since the following






A.3 Derivation of Firm Output, Prices and Revenues in All Markets
In this section we provide details about the solution to the ￿rm problem.
Derivation of revenues (4)
First, we show how to derive the expression for total revenues in (4). Total revenues of a ￿rm










53The Pareto distribution is characterized by a shape parameter k and location parameter amin, i.e. the cumulative
distribution of ability is given by G(a) = 1 ￿
￿ amin
a
￿k with amin > 0 and k > 2. We could have written A as a







Since we are interested in a mean-preserving increase in variance, we express the A as a function of ￿ and ￿, which













38For a pro￿t-maximizing ￿rm marginal revenues have to be equal across markets. Rearranging the















￿ (yHH + yHF) (A-5)
From (A-5) and its analogous for yHH we can ￿nd the two following equations:
yHH = r￿￿
H B￿




F (yHH + yHF)
￿ ￿1￿￿ (A-7)
Adding up (A-6) and (A-7) and rearranging them leads to the expression for revenues reported in
(4):








Derivation of output and prices





This ￿rst order condition, together with the zero pro￿t condition derived from free entry, implies:
srH ￿ bhH ￿ f = 0
delivers total revenues and employment:
rH =
f￿￿
s(￿￿ ￿ ￿ + 1)
hH =
f (￿ ￿ 1)
b(￿￿ ￿ ￿ + 1)
Given the production function, the expression for total output follows:
yH = A(￿;H)
￿
f (￿ ￿ 1)




Next, we determine how output is divided across the domestic and export market. We employ
(A-6) and (A-7) and their analogous for the Foreign ￿rm to ￿nd the relative output of ￿rms selling





H (yHH + yHF)
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r￿￿






F (yFF + yFH)
￿
r￿￿
H (yHH + yHF)
￿ ￿1￿￿ (A-10)
39The expressions above can be simpli￿ed using the fact that total revenues are constant in a given
sector: rH = rF = r. Together with (A-8) and its foreign equivalent, (A-9) and (A-10) deliver the
amount of output sold by a Foreign and a Home ￿rm in every market. The amounts of output sold










































Finally we derive relative revenues for a Home and a Foreign ￿rm in a given market (9) by expressing








￿ , and then replacing the expressions
for yHF and yFF.
A.4 Derivation of the Mass of Firms
Having determined the revenues of a ￿rm in each market, the mass of ￿rms in each country has to
be such that, total expenditure on good ￿ in a given country is equal to total revenues accruing to
all ￿rms operating in that market. The two equations below express these equilibrium conditions
for sector ￿:
￿(￿)LH = MH (￿)rHH (￿) + MF (￿)rFH (￿) (A-15)
￿(￿)LF = MF (￿)rFF (￿) + MH (￿)rHF (￿) (A-16)
















The solution to this linear system is given by the following expressions for MH and MF:
MH = A(￿;H)
￿￿(LHyFF ￿ LFyFH)




￿ (yFFyHH ￿ yHFyFH)
: (A-18)
40First, we show that the denominator of MH and MF is always positive. De￿ne Home productivity
advantage z (￿) =
A(￿;H)




yFF , a condition we
can rewrite as z￿ 1
￿ > z￿￿ and that is always satis￿ed since ￿ < 1.
The mass of Home ￿rms MH is positive if and only if LHyFF ￿ LFyFH > 0. This condition










Equivalently, MF is positive if and only if LFyHH ￿ LHyHF > 0, a condition that places an upper





Both ￿low and ￿up are positive under the condition that we imposed in order to guarantee that a
positive amount of output is produced for every market: ￿ < z￿￿1 < 1
￿.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
We de￿ne the mass of Home relative to Foreign ￿rms in sector ￿ as m(￿) ￿ MH
MF . We investigate how
m changes with z, assuming that we are operating in the parameter space where ￿low < ￿ < ￿up.
We rewrite the relative mass of ￿rms, using (A-17), (A-18), the expressions for Home ￿rm outputs,
(A-11) and (A-12), and the corresponding expressions for the Foreign ￿rm:
m =
z1￿￿ (1 + ￿)￿ ￿
￿
￿ + ￿2￿
z￿￿1 (1 + ￿)￿ ￿ (1 + ￿￿2)





z￿+2 (￿ ￿ 1)(1 + ￿)




(￿z￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿2 + ￿￿z￿￿1 ￿ 1)
2
This derivative is positive if the numerator is positive and the numerator can be divided in two
parts, which we show are both positive. The ￿rst part, denoted by  1 is:
 1 = ￿z1+￿ (1 + ￿)￿ + z2￿ ￿
￿ + ￿2￿
;
while the second part denoted by  2 is:
 2 = ￿hz1+￿ (1 + ￿)￿ + z2 ￿
1 + ￿￿2￿
:
It is straightforward to show that  1 > 0 if and only if ￿ > ￿low and that  2 > 0 if and only if
￿ < ￿up, conditions we have imposed throughout.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
The result follows directly since we have proven that both components of relative sales (10), relative
revenues per ￿rm
rFH(￿)
rHH(￿) and relative mass of ￿rms
MF(￿)
MH(￿) are increasing in relative productivity
41A(￿;F)
A(￿;H) (see (9) and Proposition 3) and relative productivity depends the degree of complementarity
￿ (proxied by the dispersion of wages according to Proposition 6) and the dispersion of skills
according to the discussion in Section 2.4.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 5













It follows that, if the relative mass of ￿rms is non-decreasing in relative productivity, relative exports
are higher in comparative advantage sectors, similarly to the two-country case in Proposition 4.
A.8 Derivation of the Shapley Value
In this section we provide details on how to derive the share of revenues accruing to the ￿rm and the
wages paid to workers. Stole and Zwiebel (1996) have proved the equivalence of their bargaining
solution to the Shapley value of the corresponding cooperative game not only for the case of identical
workers, but also for the case of heterogeneous workers,55 therefore we calculate the Shapley value
directly.56 The Shapley value of the ￿rm is heuristically derived as its marginal contribution
averaged over all possible orderings of employees and the ￿rm itself. The case of heterogeneous
employees is easy to handle under our assumption of a continuum of workers because no matter
how the ￿rm is ordered, it is preceded by a mass of workers whose skill distribution mirrors the
overall skill distribution in the workers population, so the only variable we have to keep track of
is the mass of workers preceding the ￿rm, de￿ne it n, which varies from zero to h. As discussed
in Acemoglu et al. (2007), since the ￿rm is an essential input its marginal contribution is equal to






￿ ￿H. The Shapley value











￿ ￿H dn = srH
where s is de￿ned by (5). As discussed in Acemoglu et al. (2007) the share of revenues accruing
to the ￿rm depends on the curvature of the revenue function, due to characteristics of the demand
function (￿) and the production function (￿).
In a similar fashion we calculate the Shapley value of a worker of skill a, by averaging its marginal








where n(a;c) = ng (a;c). The marginal contribution of a worker of skills a is given by the marginal
revenue from an increase in the mass of workers of skill a, n(a;c), conditional on the ￿rm being
54Details are available from the authors upon request.
55See their Theorems 8 and 9, p. 393.
56The analogous of the Shapley value for a continuum of players is derived in Aumann and Shapley (1974).
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Since the average wage also di⁄ers across sectors, we normalize wages by the average wage in the
sector E [w(a;￿)]. The normalized wage is denoted by e w(a;￿) =
w(a;￿)





Proof of Proposition 6
We consider three measures of wage dispersion:
(i) the Coe¢ cient of Variation of wages w(a;￿), directly related to the variance of the normalized
wage e w(a;￿), V ar(e w(a;￿)), which is given by:





2 ￿ 1; (A-21)
(ii) the Gini Coe¢ cient, de￿ned with respect to the Lorenz Curve for normalized wages at the
sector level ￿(w;￿),





where wk (wj) is the wage of the worker at the kth(jth) percentile of the sectoral wage
distribution and j < k.
(i) Coe¢ cient of Variation
Since the variance of normalized wages is equal to the square of the coe¢ cient of variation we
prove the result for the former. We start by rewriting (A-21) in an explicit form, dropping
the country index c to simplify notation:





￿2 ￿ 1 (A-22)




a2￿ loga ~ g (a)da
￿￿Z 1
0





a￿ loga ~ g (a)da
￿￿Z 1
0
a2￿ ~ g (a)da
￿
(A-23)






a2￿ loga ~ g (a)b￿ ~ g (b)dadb
We can divide the region of integration in two parts, delimited by the 45 degree line in the






b￿ ~ g (b)db
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b￿ ~ g (b)db
￿
a2￿ loga ~ g (a)da
(A-24)







b￿ ~ g (b)db
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a2￿ loga ~ g (a)da
￿
b￿ ~ g (b)db (A-25)






b￿ ~ g (b)db
￿





b2￿ logb ~ g (b)db
￿
a￿ ~ g (a)da












~ g (b) ~ g (a)db
￿
da ￿ 0
which is always satis￿ed since
￿
a￿ ￿ b￿￿
(loga ￿ logb) ￿ 0.
(ii) Gini Coe¢ cient
We proceed by deriving the Lorenz Curve for sectoral normalized wages and showing that
increasing ￿ produces a downward shift in the curve at all points. This is a su¢ cient condition
for the Gini coe¢ cient to increase with an increase in ￿. The Lorenz Curve ￿(w;￿) of
normalized wages in sector ￿ is given by the following expression:
￿(w;￿) =
R w
0 a￿~ g (a)da
R 1
0 a￿~ g (a)da
The ￿rst derivative with respect to ￿ ,
@￿(w;￿)
@￿ is non-positive if and only if the following
condition is satis￿ed 8w:
￿Z w
0











b￿ logb ~ g (b)da
￿
The region of integration can be divided into two part on both sides of the inequality, so that






























b￿ logb ~ g (b)db
￿
a￿~ g (a)da





b￿a￿ (loga ￿ logb) ~ g (b) ~ g (a) dbda ￿ 0
which is always satis￿ed since the range of integration of a is [0;w] while the range of inte-
gration of b is [w;1].
(iii) Inter-Percentile Ratio
It is straightforward to show that IPRkj increases with ￿ since for any percentile the ratio






where ak(aj) is the skill of the worker at the kth(jth) percentile.
B Appendix
B.1 Measuring Skill Dispersion
The IALS microdata used for this paper was compiled by Statistics Canada using the original
data sets collected between 1994 and 1998 in each of the participating countries. Tuijnman (2000)
describes the three dimensions of literacy used to approximate skills. Prose literacy represents the
knowledge and skills needed to understand and use information from texts including editorials, news
stories, brochures and instruction manuals. Document literacy represents the knowledge and skills
required to locate and use information contained in various formats, including job applications,
payroll forms, transportation schedules, maps, tables and charts. Quantitative literacy represents
the knowledge and skills required to apply arithmetic operations, either alone or sequentially,
to numbers embedded in printed materials, such as balancing a chequebook, ￿guring out a tip,
completing an order form or determining the amount of interest on a loan from an advertisement.
We employ the logarithm of scores (in conjunction with the log of wages) because the standard
deviation of the logarithm of a random variable is scale invariant. When extracting residual scores
in equation (14), using log-scores on the left-hand side is consistent with the common practice of
obtaining residual wages from a regression of log-wages, as in equation (15). The results of the
empirical analysis are qualitatively similar if we use levels instead of logs.
Only individuals participating in the labor market are included in the estimation of equation
(15). These individuals were either: (i) employed or unemployed at some time in the 12 months
previous to the survey or (ii) not searching for a job due to skill upgrading (school or work programs)
or a temporary disability.
The right-hand side vector XkH in equation (14) includes a number of observable individual
characteristics. Education is among them: we include indicators for 7 levels of educational at-
45tainment as de￿ned by the International Standard Classi￿cation of Education (ISCED). The levels
considered in IALS are: ISCED 0 Education preceding the ￿rst level; ISCED 1 Education at the
￿rst level; ISCED 2 Education at the second level, ￿rst stage; ISCED 3 Education at the second
level, second stage; ISCED 5 Education at the third level, ￿rst stage (leads to an award not equiv-
alent to a ￿rst university degree); ISCED 6 Education at the third level, ￿rst stage (leads to a
￿rst university degree or equivalent; ISCED 7 Education at the third level, second stage (leads to
a postgraduate university degree or equivalent); ISCED 9 Education not de￿nable by level. The
vector XkH also includes 5 age intervals 16-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55 and 56-65, gender, immigrant
status and participation in adult education or training programs 12 months prior to the survey
date. The latter ￿lters out the e⁄ect of skill upgrading on individual residual scores. As explained
in section 4.4, this is an important issue for the identi￿cation of the e⁄ect of skill dispersion on
trade ￿ ows as (unobserved) trade shocks might have an impact on aggregate skill dispersion by
changing incentives for skill upgrading at the individual level. Residual scores d ￿kH are constructed
as d ￿kH = log(skH) ￿ XkH c ￿H, where c ￿H is estimated by OLS. Analyzing the R-squared of these
country-by-country regressions, we ￿nd that the variation in residual scores d ￿kH accounts for a min-
imum of 46% of the observed variation in log-scores in Canada, for a maximum of 83% in Germany
and for 70% in Finland, the median country in the sample.57
As a result of focusing on log-scores, the scale of measurement of IALS scores does not a⁄ect the
standard deviation of d ￿kH or log(skH). Also note that, since XkH in (14) contains a constant, the
distribution of d ￿kH has the same (zero) mean in each country. For this reason, we do not normalize
the standard deviation (or any inter-percentile range) by the mean in order to make cross-country
comparisons of residual scores dispersion.
B.2 Measuring Wage Dispersion
Wage inequality measures are computed from a sample of full-time manufacturing workers, 16-65
years old, not living in group quarters, reporting positive wages and industry a¢ liation.58 Following
Dahl (2002), individuals were considered as ￿ full-time employed￿if in 1999 they: (i) were not enrolled
full time in school, (ii) worked for pay for at least ten weeks, and (iii) earned an annual salary of
at least 2,000 dollars. We focus on the log of weekly wages, calculated by dividing wage and salary
income by annual weeks worked. We use weekly wages as opposed to hourly wages, because it
requires fewer assumptions to calculate it. In the 2000 Census, hours worked are reported as ￿ usual
hours￿ . Using this variable to convert weekly wages into hourly wages would almost certainly result
in the introduction of a source of measurement error. Incomes for top-coded values are imputed by
multiplying the top code value ($175,000) by 1.5.59
In equation (15), vector Zki includes indicators for 4 categories of educational attainment,60
a quartic polynomial in age, race and gender dummies (plus their interaction), Hispanic and im-
migrant dummies (plus their interaction) and state of residence dummies. Residual wages are
constructed as c ￿ki = log(wki) ￿ Zki b ￿i, where b ￿i is estimated by OLS.
Correcting for self-selection into industries is important in estimating equation (15), as the as-
sumption that workers do not selectively search for jobs according to comparative advantage or
unobservable tastes is relevant for Proposition 6. In the presence of self-selection the distribution
57These results are available upon request.
58Manufacturing employment excludes workers in private non-pro￿t and government organizations.
59Since top codes vary by state, we follow Beaudry et al. (2007) and impose a common top-code value of $175,000.
60These are: (i) High school dropout, (ii) high school graduate, (iii) some college but no degree, (iv) college degree
or higher.
46of residual wages in any given industry would re￿ ect not only the degree of skill substitutability
in production but also workers￿skill composition. For this reason, we use a selection estimator
proposed by Dahl (2002). In equation (15), correcting for self-selection is complicated by the fact
that individuals could choose to search for a job in any of the 63 industries of the manufacturing
sector, potentially making the error mean, i.e. E(￿
kijk is observed in i), a function of the char-
acteristics of all the alternatives. In this case, Dahl (2002) argues that under a speci￿c su¢ ciency
assumption,61 the error mean is only a function of the probability that a person born in the same
state as k would make the choice that k actually made (i.e. selecting into industry i), which can be
estimated. The su¢ ciency assumption can be relaxed by including functions of additional selection
probabilities; for this reason, Zki includes a cubic polynomial in the estimated ￿rst-best selection
probability and in the highest predicted probability for k. Identi￿cation in this approach is based
on the exclusion of state of birth by industry of employment interactions from equation (15).
To estimate selection probabilities, we group individuals into cells de￿ned by state of birth62
and a vector of discrete characteristics: 4 categories of education attainment, 4 age intervals (16-
30, 31-40, 41-50, 51-65), race, gender and 2 binary indicators of family status (family/non-family
household and presence of own child 18 or younger in the household). As in Dahl (2002), for every
individual k, we estimate his selection probability into each industry j using the proportion of
individuals within k￿ s cell that are observed working in j, denoted by c pkj. Individual k￿ s estimated
￿rst-best selection probability is c pki and k￿ s highest predicted probability is given by d pkj￿, where
j￿ is such that d pkj￿ = maxfc pkjg 8j.
For the empirical analysis, the Census industry classi￿cation was matched to NAICS. It was
not possible to match the trade data to Census codes directly, since the former is originally coded
according to the Standard International Trade Classi￿cation (SITC rev.2). However, it is possible
to use NAICS as a bridge between the two classi￿cations. We construct a one-to-one mapping
between the Census classi￿cation and NAICS by re-coding two or more 4 digit NAICS codes into
a single industry (which does not necessarily match a 3 digit level). This re-coding also involves
cases where two Census codes map perfectly into two NAICS codes -although originally there
was no one-to-one matching between them. Importantly, the resulting mapping (available upon
request) exhausts all manufacturing sectors in NAICS. Finally, the trade data was matched to wage
inequality data using a concordance between SITC rev. 2 and NAICS, available through the NBER
online database.
C Appendix - Additional Data
In this Appendix we provide a description of additional data sources used in the empirical analysis.
Descriptive statistics for each variable can be found in table 8.
Bilateral export volumes at the industry level: From Feenstra et al. (2005), for the year 2000.
Sector-level bilateral exports data are categorized at the 4-digit SITC (4-digit rev. 2) level. The
mapping from SITC to NAICS required the concordance available at the NBER website.63
Bilateral trade barriers: From HMR. This is a set of exporter-importer speci￿c geographical,
cultural and institutional variables. 1) Distance, the distance (in km.) between importer￿ s and
exporter￿ s capitals (in logs). 2) Land border, a binary variable that equals one if and only if
61See Dahl (2002), page 2378.
62As in Beaudry et al. (2007), we keep immigrants in the analysis by dividing the rest of the world into 14 regions
(or ￿ states￿of birth).
63http://www.nber.org/lipsey/sitc22naics97/
47importer and exporter are neighbors that meet a common physical boundary. 3) Island, the number
of countries in the pair that are islands. 4) Landlocked, the number of countries in the pair that
have no coastline or direct access to sea. 5) Colonial ties, a binary variable that equals one if and
only if the importing country ever colonized the exporting country or vice versa. 6) Legal system, a
binary variable that equals one if and only if the importing and exporting countries share the same
legal origin. 7) Common Language, a binary variable that equals one if and only if the exporting
importing countries share a common language. 8) Religion, computed as (% Protestants in exporter
￿ % Protestants in importer)+(% Catholics in exporter ￿ % Catholics in importer)+(% Muslims
in exporter ￿ % Muslims in importer). 9) FTA, a binary variable that equals one if exporting
and importing countries belong to a common regional trade agreement, and zero otherwise. 10)
GATT/WTO, the number of countries in the pair that belong to the GATT/WTO.
Start-up regulation costs: From HMR. We use exporter-importer interactions of three prox-
ies of regulation costs: the number of days (RegDaysH ￿ RegDaysF), number of legal proce-
dures (RegProcH ￿RegProcF) and relative cost as a percentage of GDP per capita (RegProcH ￿
RegProcF), for an entrepreneur to start operating a business.
Factor endowments: Physical capital endowment, KEndow, and human capital endowment,
SkillEndow, are taken from Antweiler and Tre￿ er (2002). A country￿ s stock of physical capital is
the log of the average capital stock per worker. The stock of human capital is the natural log of
the ratio of workers that completed high school to those that did not. The measures used are from
1992, the closest year of which data are available. There￿ s no data on factor endowments for four
countries in our sample: Switzerland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
Factor intensities: From Nunn (2007). Originally coded as 1997 I-O industries, the mapping
to NAICS required a concordance available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.64 Physical
capital intensity, KIntens, is the total real capital stock divided by value added of the industry
in the United States in 1996. Skill intensity, SkillIntens, is the ratio of non-production worker
wages to total wages at the industry level in the United States in 1996. There￿ s no data on factor
intensities for two industries: ￿ Furniture and related products manufacturing￿and ￿ Sawmills and
wood preservation￿ .
Proportion of top-coded wages: From the 2000 Census of Population in the U.S. For each
industry, TopCode is calculated as the proportion of workers earning a wage exceeding the top
code value of $175,000.
Firm size dispersion: From the 1997 Census of manufacturing in the U.S. For each industry, we
calculate FirmDisp, the coe¢ cient of variation in the average shipments per establishment across
bins de￿ned by employment size. The employment bins de￿ned in the Census are: 1-4, 5-9, 10-19,
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Figure 2: Standard Deviation of Residual Wages by Industry
49Table 1 - IALS log-scores
Exporter Mean St Dev St Dev Resid
CV Rank Rank Rank Rank
1 Denmark 3 5.671 1 0.150 1 0.134
2 Germany 6 5.654 2 0.162 3 0.151
3 Netherlands 4 5.666 3 0.167 2 0.149
4 Norway 2 5.684 4 0.171 4 0.156
5 Finland 5 5.666 5 0.181 5 0.162
6 Sweden 1 5.717 6 0.184 6 0.168
7 Czech Republic 7 5.636 7 0.190 7 0.171
8 Hungary 15 5.546 8 0.204 9 0.192
9 Belgium 8 5.632 9 0.221 10 0.199
10 New Zeland 10 5.597 10 0.240 13 0.222
11 United Kingdom 11 5.595 11 0.262 19 0.318
12 Ireland 14 5.569 12 0.266 12 0.222
13 Switzerland 13 5.573 13 0.269 8 0.189
14 Canada 9 5.628 14 0.274 11 0.216
15 Italy 16 5.499 15 0.285 16 0.256
16 United States 12 5.587 16 0.289 14 0.227
17 Chile 19 5.355 17 0.302 15 0.230
18 Slovenia 17 5.446 18 0.314 17 0.260
19 Poland 18 5.415 19 0.333 18 0.312
50Table 2 - Wage Dispersion
Mean St Dev St Dev Res
CV Exporter Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage
Rank Rank Rank Rank
1 Railroad rolling stock 22 6.504 1 0.515 1 0.419
2 Aircraft, aerospace products and parts 4 6.814 6 0.560 7 0.462
3 Nonferrous metals, exc. aluminum 25 6.485 3 0.544 2 0.442
4 Fiber, yarn, and thread mills 56 6.153 2 0.521 3 0.448
5 Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills 9 6.654 8 0.564 9 0.473
6 Engines, turbines, and power trans. equipment 10 6.620 10 0.570 4 0.455
7 Dairy products 38 6.377 5 0.552 6 0.461
8 Veneer, plywood, and engineered wood products 45 6.291 4 0.547 11 0.477
9 Iron and steel mills and steel product 15 6.583 13 0.573 16 0.490
10 Ship and boat building 30 6.443 7 0.564 8 0.467
11 Cement, concrete, lime, and gypsum 28 6.455 11 0.571 20 0.492
12 Foundries 35 6.391 9 0.565 13 0.485
13 Industrial and miscellaneous chemicals 5 6.784 30 0.608 25 0.497
14 Aluminum production and processing 21 6.511 17 0.587 12 0.485
15 Rubber products 29 6.454 15 0.584 15 0.488
16 Agric implement, constr., mining and oil ￿eld machinery 18 6.525 23 0.596 10 0.474
17 Household appliances 44 6.339 14 0.579 5 0.461
18 Metalworking machinery 20 6.513 22 0.595 23 0.496
19 Machinery, n.e.c. 26 6.471 24 0.598 18 0.491
20 Structural metals, and tank and shipping containers 37 6.380 18 0.589 33 0.507
21 Machine shops; turned product; screw, nut and bolt mfg. 32 6.400 19 0.591 44 0.523
22 Ordinance and misc. fabricated metal 39 6.376 20 0.592 19 0.491
23 Petroleum and Coal Products 1 6.835 39 0.636 42 0.519
24 Paperboard containers, boxes misc. paper and pulp 31 6.414 27 0.604 22 0.496
25 Glass 42 6.355 26 0.601 34 0.507
26 Animal slaughtering and processing 61 6.051 12 0.572 26 0.498
27 Furniture 54 6.169 16 0.586 36 0.510
28 Navig, measuring, electromedical, and control instr. 8 6.666 37 0.634 21 0.495
29 Resin, synthetic rubber and ￿bers, and ￿laments 14 6.591 35 0.628 17 0.490
30 Cutlery and hand tools 41 6.364 29 0.607 14 0.486
31 Sawmills and wood preservation 51 6.206 21 0.595 37 0.511
32 Animal food, grain and oilseed milling 27 6.470 34 0.624 38 0.513
51Table 2 - Continued
Mean St Dev St Dev Res
Log Wage Log Wage Log Wage
Rank Rank Rank
33 Miscellaneous nonmetallic minerals 36 6.382 33 0.621 39 0.514
34 Commercial and service industry machinery 12 6.613 44 0.646 24 0.497
35 Beverages 17 6.537 43 0.641 45 0.532
36 Fabric Mills 57 6.123 25 0.601 29 0.502
37 Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment 13 6.594 45 0.648 43 0.521
38 Electrical lighting, equipment, and supplies, n.e.c. 33 6.399 36 0.631 27 0.500
39 Plastics 47 6.271 32 0.619 31 0.504
40 Textile product mills 59 6.089 28 0.605 35 0.509
41 Prefab. wood build., mobile homes and misc. wood prod 53 6.190 31 0.617 48 0.542
42 Agricultural chemicals 16 6.579 47 0.657 40 0.518
43 Paint, coating, and adhesive B46 19 6.523 46 0.652 46 0.534
44 Printing and related support activities 40 6.370 42 0.639 49 0.546
45 Pharmaceutical and medicine 3 6.821 56 0.694 50 0.550
46 Pottery, ceramics and structural clay 48 6.262 40 0.637 47 0.541
47 Fruit and vegetable preserving and specialty food 49 6.239 38 0.635 41 0.518
48 Other transportation equipment 34 6.394 48 0.658 30 0.503
49 Textile and fabric ￿nishing and coating mills 52 6.197 41 0.637 32 0.504
50 Tobacco 6 6.728 57 0.705 55 0.558
51 Footwear 58 6.116 49 0.659 28 0.500
52 Toys, amusement, sporting goods and misc, n.e.c. 50 6.234 52 0.672 61 0.565
53 Communications, audio, and video equipment 7 6.724 60 0.725 59 0.562
54 Computer and peripheral equipment 2 6.834 62 0.739 62 0.576
55 Medical equipment and supplies 24 6.496 58 0.706 53 0.553
56 Bakeries 55 6.166 51 0.670 63 0.576
57 Sugar and confectionery products 46 6.285 54 0.683 51 0.550
58 Leather tanning and products, except footwear 60 6.069 50 0.667 54 0.556
59 Electronic component and product, n.e.c. 11 6.620 61 0.730 57 0.559
60 Seafood and other miscellaneous foods, n.e.c. 43 6.346 59 0.712 52 0.551
61 Cut and sew apparel 63 5.876 53 0.677 60 0.564
62 Soap, cleaning compound, and cosmetics 23 6.503 63 0.754 56 0.559
63 Apparel accessories and other apparel 62 5.900 55 0.689 58 0.560
52Table 3 - Normalized Raw Scores and Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Measure
of Dispersion St Dev
Mean
95-5 IPR




WageDispi ￿ SkillDispH 0.168** 0.107* 0.121** 0.193** 0.122** 0.122**
(0.048) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Trade Barriers No No No Yes Yes Yes
Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Importer-Industry FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 58124 58124 58124 58124 58124 58124
R-squared 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.7 0.69 0.7
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of exports from country H to country F in industry i.
Standardized beta coe¢ cients are reported. y, * and ** indicate the coe¢ cient is signi￿cant at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors clustered by importer-exporter pair in parenthesis.
53Table 4 - Non-Normalized Interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Measure of
Dispersion St Dev 95-5 IPR Gini MD St Dev 95-5 IPR Gini MD
WageDispi ￿ SkillDispH 0.210** 0.076 0.208* 0.331** 0.176** 0.330**
(0.079) (0.074) (0.091) (0.076) (0.067) (0.085)
WageMeani ￿ SkillMeanH 9.132** 10.232** 10.696** 9.626** 10.561** 10.853**
(0.602) (0.590) (0.708) (0.504) (0.503) (0.595)
WageMeani ￿ SkillDispH 2.396** 2.972** 3.050** 2.233** 2.726** 2.749**
(0.240) (0.232) (0.285) (0.197) (0.195) (0.238)
WageDispi ￿ SkillMeanH 0.777 0.098 1.039 1.669** 0.900y 2.014**
(0.487) (0.481) (0.568) (0.485) (0.461) (0.550)
Trade Barriers No No No Yes Yes Yes
Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Importer-Industry FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 58124 58124 58124 58124 58124 58124
R-squared 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.70 0.70 0.70
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of exports from country H to country F in industry i.
Standardized beta coe¢ cients are reported. y, * and ** indicate the coe¢ cient is signi￿cant at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors clustered by importer-exporter pair in parenthesis.
54Table 5 - Residual Wage and Residual Score Dispersion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Measure of
Dispersion St Dev 95-5 IPR Gini MD St Dev 95-5 IPR Gini MD
WageDispi ￿ SkillDispH 0.224** 0.168** 0.134* 0.230** 0.149** 0.104y
(0.051) (0.050) (0.058) (0.046) (0.049) (0.056)
Trade Barriers No No No Yes Yes Yes
Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Importer-Industry FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 58124 58124 58124 58124 58124 58124
R-squared 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.70 0.70 0.69
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of exports from country H to country F in
industry i. Standardized beta coe¢ cients are reported. y, * and ** indicate the coe¢ cient is
signi￿cant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Bootstrap standard errors clustered by importer-
exporter pair in parenthesis (50 replications).
55Table 6 - Selection and Other Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline HMR Heckscher Firm Size Top Without
Selection Ohlin Dispersion Coding US
WageDispi ￿ SkillDispH 0.230** 0.212** 0.306** 0.229** 0.377** 0.210**
(0.046) (0.049) (0.063) (0.059) (0.075) (0.044)
KIntensi ￿ KEndowH 0.250**
(0.074)




TopCodei ￿ SkillDispH -0.087*
(0.034)
Trade Barriers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer-Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 58124 52455 41301 52455 52455 48129
R-squared 0.69 0.69 0.73 0.69 0.69 0.68
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of exports from country H to country F in industry i.
Standardized beta coe¢ cients are reported. y, * and ** indicate the coe¢ cient is signi￿cant at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels. Bootstrap standard errors clustered by importer-exporter pair in parenthesis (50.
replications). The measure of dispersion employed is the standard deviation of residual wages and residual
scores. Column (6) is the same speci￿cation of column (2) excluding the observations involving
US as exporter. The regression includes a polynomial in the probability to export, obtained from
the ￿rst stage, which is signi￿cant and we do not report.
56Table 7 - First Stages of Table 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HMR Heckscher Firm Size Top Without
Selection Ohlin Dispersion Coding US
WageDispi ￿ SkillDispH 0.025y 0.090** 0.063** 0.118** 0.024y
(0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014)
RegCostsH ￿ RegCostsF 0.013** 0.001 0.013** 0.013** 0.006
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
RegDaysH ￿ RegDaysF 0.014* 0.020 0.014* 0.014* 0.012*
(0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
RegProcH ￿ RegProcF 0.029** 0.077** 0.029** 0.029** 0.031**
(0.009) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
KIntensi ￿ KEndowH 0.027*
(0.012)




TopCodei ￿ SkillDispH -0.055**
(0.008)
Trade Barriers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer-Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 132867 94794 132867 132867 124740
R-squared 0.57 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.58
Columns (1)-(5) report the ￿rst stage estimation results corresponding to Columns (2)-(6) of
Table D. The dependent variable is a dummy that is one if exports from country H to country F
in industry i are positive and zero otherwise. Standardized beta coe¢ cients are reported.
y, * and ** indicate the coe¢ cient is signi￿cant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Bootstrap
standard errors clustered by importer-exporter pair in parenthesis (50 replications). The
measure of dispersion employed is the standard deviation of residual wages and residual scores.
Column (6) is the same speci￿cation of column (2) excluding the observations involving US as
exporter. All estimations were performed with a linear probability model.
57Table 8 - Additional Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Exports dummy 173565 0.335 0.472 0 1
Exports volume (XHFi) 58124 7.866 2.204 0 17.906
Language 2755 0.193 0.395 0 1
Legal 2755 0.217 0.412 0 1
Religion 2755 0.196 0.257 0 0.973
Land Border 2755 0.019 0.135 0 1
Currency Union 2755 0.002 0.047 0 1
Distance 2755 4.136 0.806 0.882 5.661
FTA 2755 0.017 0.131 0 1
Colonial Ties 2755 0.022 0.146 0 1
Gatt / WTO 2755 1.489 0.578 0 2
Island 2755 0.291 0.494 0 2
Landlock 2755 0.309 0.509 0 2
RegProcF 112 9.679 3.491 2 19
RegDaysF 112 49.402 38.593 2 203
RegCostsF 112 90.065 165.785 0 1268.4
RegProcH 19 5.947 2.818 2 10
RegDaysH 19 23.842 16.433 3 61
RegCostsH 19 7.874 7.190 0 22.9
SkillEndowH 14 -3.435 0.402 -4.522 -2.957
KEndowH 14 -0.530 0.662 -1.377 0.925
SkillIntensi 61 0.381 0.116 0.166 0.757
KIntensi 61 0.859 0.464 0.235 2.535
TopCodei 63 0.009 0.005 0.004 0.030
FirmDispi 63 3.055 1.418 1.015 6.940
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